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Introduction Data Collection and Survey Area Econometric Framework
Conclusion
• A potential borrower would be preliminary
rationed by lack of creditworthiness, insufficient
implicit collateral requirements, weak bargaining
power, transaction costs and, urgent needs by
others.
• There might be a selection based on
creditworthiness, political distortion, and wealth
bias in loan allocation.
Background
• Microfinance (MF) has attracted growing attention
as a means of improving financial access. Reflecting
the enthusiasm about it, Government of India has
initiated the biggest MF program since 1992.
• This program adopts a group lending methodology
with joint liability based on Self-Help Group (SHG)
in which microloans are designed to be allocated
among members by themselves.
The Scheme of SHG program
Formation of SHGs
• One SHG is composed by 10-20 women who can be
selected based on geographical proximity.
→ self selection, heterogeneity in a group
Financial Transactions
• Members are obligated to hold weekly meetings
for collecting compulsory savings (10-50
Rs/meeting). And there are two types of loan: the
internal loan and the external loan. The internal
loan comes from their own accounts accumulated
by compulsory savings, while the external loan is
disbursed by the formal bank to a group.
• The interest rate, the repayment schedule, and
loan allocation are determined by members.
• The external loan can’t be available without
repayments of previous loans. Thus only in a
beginning of loan cycle can they apply and issue
the external loan to members.
• Note that loans are taken from banks in the
group’s name but each of the members conducts
her business individually.
• The interaction between a applicant and other
members may be modeled as a sequential two-stage
decision process (Zeller [1994]WD, Mushinski [1999]JDS).
A borrower’s decision making
• Nested logit model (apply, partial apply, not apply)
The joint probability of choosing alternative jb can be
written as
This probability can be written as
This term is the inclusive value in the first-best
choice.
• z is a vector of observed attributes that vary across
the first-best strategies.
• x is a vector of observed attributes that vary across
the second-best strategies; factors related to
information asymmetries, bargaining power,
characteristics of other applicants.
Lender’s decision making
• Multinomial logit Model
(accept, partial accept, not accept)
Conclusion
• The access to microcredit is not necessarily
guaranteed for all of members in SHGs and loan
is allocated in group lending with two types of
credit rationing.
• This paper focuses on a bargaining process in loan
allocation to clarify the determinants of both
types of credit rationing.
(A subset of ) Estimation Results
How to identify credit rationing
(almost same method with Boucher, Guirkinger, and
Trivelli [2009] EDCC)
• Whether had you applied for a loan in 12 month?
If no, why had you not done so? If yes, would you
want to applied for another loan? ( apply, partial
apply, not apply, no demand)
• Whether any applications were approved? If yes,
had your applications been partially accepted? (
accept, partial accept, not accepted) Motivation 
• Despite the proliferation of
impact evaluation studies on MF,
few studies shed light on loan
allocation or actual credit access.
• There exists a black box which
contains several questions. How
do members allocate microloan
within a group? Does there still
exist credit rationing among







of group  lending
Member’s decision-making
No demand  Notional demand 
Apply  Not apply 
Demand-side rationing Effective demand
• This paper empirically explores these question. The
objective is to clarify the determinants of loan
allocation and credit access within group lending,
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• The data: 220 households (SHG members) in
Sultan Battery gram panchayat, Wayanad district,
Kerala, gathered between Aug and Oct 2008.
• Questionnaire: family compositions and labor
market participation, landholdings, fixed assets,
annual income, credit transactions, gift exchange,
and social network etc.
• Note that we also collected the above information
on other members who applied in a same loan
cycle recorded in financial books of each SHG.
External loan
Coef. Z-value Coef. Z-value
Applicant
Effective demand for loan -0.567 -0.4537 -0.079 -2.6243
Permanent income -0.007 -0.4201 -0.402 -3.5782
Transitory income 0.012 0.7038 -0.001 -0.923
Dummy for past default 0.228 0.117 0.221 0.601
Landholdings 0.211 2.1645 0.281 1.3213
Fixed asset 0.029 2.6789 0.019 1.1889
Savings in SHG -0.151 -3.3414 -0.1439 -0.2305
Social position in village 0.46 2.5134 0.862 1.4093
Social position in SHG -0.566 -3.5415 -0.623 -2.9661
Fixed effect for social caste 0.3275 -0.7038 1.0991 3.3322
Average of other applicant
Effective demand for loan 0.3275 1.2205 0.3294 1.4018
Permanent income 1.1861 4.06 1.0991 4.045
Transitory income 1.7476 3.4996 1.661 3.3322
Dummy for past default -0.128 -3.117 -0.424 -4.101
Landholdings 0.0007 2.4388 0.0006 2.513
Fixed asset -0.3284 -2.0701 -0.3046 -1.732
Savings in SHG 1.231 2.41 1.163 0.2305
Social position in village 0.2013 0.4537 0.906 0.9161
Social position in SHG 1.0505 3.4201 4.8021 2.8939
Fixed effect for SHGs
Multinomial logit model for lender's decision making
Partial accept Not accept External loan
Coef. Z-value Coef. Z-value
Constant -1.436 -1.6928 -1.625 -1.913
Applicant
Permanent income -0.3505 -2.9719 -0.7371 -3.7746
Transitory income 0.0117 1.4995 0.5626 1.6775
Dummy for past default 0.3275 1.2205 0.8322 3.0409
Landholdings 0.1861 0.106 0.0857 0.9042
Fixed asset 1.7476 0.4996 2.5098 0.1959
Savings in SHG 0.0439 0.2305 0.1951 0.1305
Social position in village 0.7638 2.2634 0.2807 1.2352
Social position in SHG 0.0007 2.4388 0.0008 2.9947
Distance from formal bank 0.6388 2.0188 0.7503 2.5913
Dummy for SC/ST 0.0006 2.513 0.0007 2.5699
Average of other applicants
Permanent income 0.006 0.9161 0.0505 0.0709
Transitory income -0.8021 -2.8939 -0.6892 -3.0674
Dummy for past default 0.0412 0.2062 0.1601 1.0849
Landholdings -0.04 -2.8778 -1.0691 -0.1113
Fixed asset -1.1133 -0.2751 -1.1384 -0.4235
Savings in SHG 0.3399 2.5251 0.3379 2.4967
Social position in village 0.5297 0.5175 0.4848 0.1136
Social position in SHG 1.1038 4.0894 1.1064 3.4748
Fixed effects for SHGs
σ 0.5767 0.2325 0.67 0.2178
τ 0.7821 0.2903 0.9378 0.2982
Partial applying Not applying
Nested multinomial logit model borrower's decision making